SteveGoob

Fair enough, but there’s a reason no one runs almost any of the systemd services in isolation. There’s a big difference between “takes a bit of tinkering” and “need to maintain massive patch files to make journald independent of systemd”

Yeah, I noticed that too. At the end of the day, it’s not particularly important, but it is a bit of an embarassing mistake.

Except that the author does not end the discussion at “it doesn’t follow the Unix philosophy.” Granted, they do spend a number of words refuting the argument that systemd is modular; whether or not it’s a strawman, it sounds like you already agree with the author on that point. While they do pay some lip service to the value of the Unix Philosophy, their arguement hardly ends there.

From the article, (bold emphasis mine):

This lack of modularity – where “modularity” means free choice in interchanging components for other, unrelated projects – is where most of the criticism of systemd stems. It’s the purest, and most important, criticism of systemd, but my personal grievances against systemd go further. Because, in my experience, systemd isn’t good software.

The author provides evidence for that claim with examples regarding journald, networkd, and session keyrings. None of those criticisms are specific to the Unix Philosophy. Their whole point appears to be “yes, I value software that follows the Unix Philosophy, and systemd does not, but I believe there are many other valid reasons that systemd isn’t good.”

Of course these concerns play into each other, but the nuance there is kinda the whole point. The author points out that it would be a lot easier to use only the good parts if systemd had a more genuinely modular architecture, but it’s simply not built for that. And it’s a real and material example of a negative consequence of not following the Unix Philosophy. Rather than say “it’s not developed with the UP in mind, it must therefore be bad,” the author gives a tangible example representative of why they believe that to be important.

Just as the Unix Philosophy is a thought-terminating cliché (because of course it is), it is similarly unhelpful to claim that consolidation brings performance and cross-cutting capabilities. The proof is in the pudding, and as critical readers we should not overlook valuable perspectives like the one the author has brought.

(Not that it’s critical to your point, but we’re you trying to argue that Wayland is monolithic? I have to assume you didn’t mean it like that, since it’s a protocol that decouples clients and compositors, and it’s certainly not monolithic in that sense)

That argument is addressed in the article. With few practical exceptions, systemd components expect you to be running the other systemd services. E.g. running systemd without journald is not a supported usecase.

But in your mind, those all pale in comparison to what will happen if we all start using passkeys? I’m not buying what you’re selling.

Because you appear to be misunderstand what I’m saying. Be careful to not put words in my mouth. I said nothing regarding bans.

I am, however, arguing that a service provider can reject your passkey if they dont like how you manage it, (e.g make it copiable). To access that service using a passkey, you’ll have to accept storing your credential on their terms.

And to be clear, I’m in no way blind to the issues with passwords. We’ve had to tack on a bunch of extras to have password based security keep up, like TOTP, password hashing, recovery methods, phishing resistant tokens, security questions, and so on. I’m not arguing that passwords are perfect; I’m arguing that they preserve the users ultimate control over the credential. I’m totally open and hopeful for improvements to authentication as long as they similarly preserve the user’s freedom to manage their credentials as they see fit.

And this may be where the difference in our values shows, since it appears that you view the user’s freedom as more of a problem than a boon:

The same special property that allows rampant attacks on the public. I deal with so many people with compromised email inboxes, malware installs, stolen credentials, etc. Passwords are not the end solution to end user security, and I welcome improvements that also simplify UX.

I’m sorry you’ve had to deal with that, but I simply don’t think some users making mistakes justifies allowing a service provider to remove a critical freedom from the user. I dont believe that improved UX and security has to come at the cost of user freedom, but that’s what passkeys explicitly allow for by design. I fundamentally disagree with that.

I didn’t say [attestation] was tangential. Attestation is for very specific purpose.

Fair enough, I tend to thow it in the same category as “DRM and other gate-keeping technologies” which you did call “tangential.” At the end of the day, for the purposes of my argument, they are the same: a service wishes to exert control over how a client runs, and I object to such limitions broadly speaking. The computers I own work for me, not the service. (Of course this changes in enterprises that own their own clients, like the workstations used by their workforce. But even in those situations, however, I would argue that there are generally more effective measures than remote attestation. But I digress…)

I highly doubt any public service would require attested passkeys.

Ah, but how can you be sure? You’re missing the guarentee that they can’t flip the script on you. The standard allows them to start forcing users to rotate their passwords and passkeys for ones that require attestation of their preferred settings. Maybe it’s unlikely, but “unlikely” is still a massive downgrade from “impossible.” IMO, it’s unacceptable.

Here’s another counter-point: Google, Apple, et. al already implement proprietary authentication mechanisms. …

Just because a standard is open does not mean it isn’t rigged in the favor of closed platforms. This is especially the case with passkeys, where platforms use them to further entrench you into their ecosystem, often under the guise of “look how good the UX is!” For example, MacOS really, really wants you to tie your passkeys to their keychain, so that they can control how it’s backed up, transferred, and stored. Remote attestation only makes this worse, opening the possibility that a service provider can enforce that you have to use MacOS’s keychain. Sounds like a walled garden to me.

I see no evidence, technical or otherwise, that passkeys are subverting or acting counter to any of these principles. Frankly, it’s a baseless claim that passkeys lock people out of their own control/infrastructure.

The evidence is in the fact that the passkey standard provides the means to deny service to anyone whose passkeys do not match the service provider’s preferences. This is a non-issue with passwords, since there’s no way for a provider to tell whether or not, for example, a password is simply remembered, stored in your password manager, backed up, shared, etc… The threat model of the user can inform what choices they make there. The platform may require certain things of the password, like length requirments or another factor, but it ends there.

You’re correct in that the standard supports passkeys with similar data sovereignty properties; however, the standard includes controls that allow service providers to dictate that those properties be configured to the provider’s preferences, not the user’s.

Just don’t use [locked down passkeys] if you don’t want to.

It would all be well and good if that were actually entirely my choice, but it’s not. The standard specifically includes a trump card for the service provider in the form of remote attestation. You seem to think that’s tangential, but I reject that. It’s kinda the whole point.

Authenticating based on a shared secret is an interface with a special property: there’s no way for a service provider to know how you remember a secret. That guarantee is extremely important. Service providers accepting password based authentication are guaranteed to not be able to enforce requirements on how you remember your password.

The Passkey standard removes that critical protection by explicitly supporting remote attestation in the standard. It does not matter that the standard is public if it does not preserve that guarantee.

Passkeys are fine, vendor-locking and walled gardens are not.

If you’re not a fan of walled gardens, I would recommend against giving corporations the mortar, bricks, gates, and locks with which they use to build them. Maybe they won’t use them in ways you don’t like, but you’ll never have a guarantee that they won’t.

There are lots of reasons to like passkeys from a technical/enterprise standpoint, but I do think you’re missing the critical issue the article is speaking to: digital sovereignty.

Passkeys, while more secure in the average usecase, shift the balance of control over your access to services. Yes, you can no longer write your password down on a post-it and leak it in a photo—thats’s a good property. But trading that at the expense of your freedom to run software as you see fit on hardware you bought and paid for? For many people, myself included, that’s not an acceptable tradeoff. There are plenty of tools and systems around passwords that folks can use to make passwords+2FA match or even exceed the security properties of passkeys.

The thing that should chill everyone is the fact that built into the standard is a switch (given to service providers, not users) that locks out the people that do want to have control of their digital infrastructure. Not everyone can or should be expected to run like that, but they should not be blocked from doing so. Similar with the Right to Repair; not everyone can exercise that right on their own, but no one should be prevented from repairing what they bought.

Similary, I do believe it’s my neighbor’s right to practice a religion of their choosing. So if the government tries to prevent them from doing that, I’m going to go grab my pitchfork, not because I share their religion, but because they should be able to make that choice. Likewise, while I might not want to exert control over how my credentials are backed up, I still reserve the right to do it, and support anyone else’s ability to do it.

And to address the slippery slope objection, I have to point out that this is not particularly theoretical. When Big Tech has provided service providers with the opportunity to enforce restrictions on your device, service providers have used it. Widevine DRM, Google Play Protect, etc… It’s why my LineageOS phone can’t use banking apps, which is a shame since some features like Zelle payments are specifically a mobile-only feature, and so I cannot use it anymore. I either run my phone to the exact specs and settings that my bank and Google prefer, or I’m denied access to basic banking anywhere but my desktop (and who knows how long until the block my access there, I run Linux afterall).

I do not trust Big Tech with my devices, and passkeys increase their capability to deny anyone who doesn’t buy into their ecosystem, and further entrenches those who already are. I for one find that despicable, and an unacceptable tradeoff. There’s no reason it has to be this way though, passkeys could have been the best of both worlds. However, they’ve been compromised with features that serve platforms at the expense of user freedom. It’s the kind of disempowerment that happens when you give the reins to power-hungry, profit-seeking corporations.